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INTRODUCTION

Protections against compulsory self-incrimination are prevalent in Western international and domestic law and norms.1 Military servicemembers, like private
citizens, are subject to those standards and protections that international and domestic law afford.2 However, unlike in the case of private citizens, the United
States government has administrative interests in knowing whether its servicemembers have been arrested or charged with a crime, including matters relating
to personnel management and planning.3 This governmental interest is the principal justification for promulgating regulations that compel servicemembers to
report their own arrests and criminal charges.4
Due to the nature of the information that the government seeks, information
that could also serve as evidence in a criminal investigation, the government’s
interest is inherently at odds with protections against self-incrimination.5 Courts
have recognized this tension and accounted for it by permitting self-reporting
regulations on a limited basis.6 However, United States military courts have held
that for self-reporting regulations to survive scrutiny under self-incrimination
protections, the regulations must be purely regulatory in nature, not punitive.7
This Note attempts to show that due to the challenges of properly applying
military self-reporting regulations as they currently stand and the ambiguities
within self-incrimination protections, these self-reporting regulations are ultimately used for punitive purposes and thus may run afoul of international and
domestic self-incrimination standards.

1 E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part III, art. 14, ¶ 3, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Murray v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57980 (recognizing the privilege against
self-incrimination under art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights) [hereinafter
ECHR]; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 See United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (inferring that the selfincrimination rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution apply to military
members).
3 United States v. Castillo, 74. M.J. 160, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (“[T]he Navy has a legitimate administrative or regulatory interest in knowing whether sailors have been arrested by
civilian authorities.”).
4 Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 at 9 (the regulatory exception applies “when the constitutional interests of the individual must be balanced with the public need and instructs that ‘[t]he Fifth
Amendment is not violated when the Government is allowed “to gain access to items or information vested with . . . [a] public character.’”“)
5 See, e.g., id.
6 Id.
7 Id. (“The court concluded that the [regulation] was punitive rather than regulatory in
nature, compelling an incriminatory testimonial communication . . . the court concluded that
the Instruction could not be sustained as a regulatory exception.”)
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Before attending law school and writing this note, I served as an active duty
officer in the United States Marine Corps for just over ten years. During my career in the Marines, I served as a pilot and legal officer, among other duties.
While the hypothetical situation in this Note reflects my own military experience,
the events in the hypothetical are fictitious. The opinions and conclusions I advance in this note are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Marine Corps or Navy.
A. The Hypothetical
It is 0715—7:15 AM in common parlance—on a Monday morning following
a long holiday weekend. Lance Corporal Jones (Jones) waits outside the Sergeant
Major’s8 office, visibly nervous. As I approach, he greets me with a sterile,
“Good Morning, Sir,” and continues to stare straight ahead.9 I think nothing of it
and proceed to my office, where I, a new pilot and junior officer, perform my
non-flying duties as squadron legal officer. 10 The Sergeant Major arrives and
beckons Jones into his office. The door shuts, and the Sergeant Major’s noticeably angry voice can be heard through the walls. The door opens, Jones walks out,
and the Sergeant Major informs me, as the legal officer, that Jones was arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) while vacationing in another
state.11 Jones reported his DUI arrest to the Sergeant Major as required by applicable Navy regulations, primarily Chief of Naval Operations Instruction

8 A Sergeant Major is the most senior enlisted Marine in an organizational unit. MOS
8999 Sergeant Major-First Sergeant, MARINE CORPS COOL (last updated July 31, 2020),
https://www.cool.navy.mil/usmc/enlisted/8999.htm. Generally, sergeants-major assist unit
commanders in conducting disciplinary proceedings and investigations. Id.
9 Military “customs and courtesies” require junior members to render “greetings of the
day,” among other things, when encountering members who are senior to them. See generally
Marine Corps Order 5060.20, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS (May 15, 2019),
https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCO%205060.20_signed_EDD.pdf?ver=2019-06-05-103257-473 (providing a detailed description of standard Marine Corps customs, courtesies, ceremonies, and traditions).
Failure to render appropriate customs and courtesies may result in prosecution under Article
92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1956).
10 A legal officer is a non-lawyer military officer who advises military commanders about
legal considerations of military disciplinary proceedings and courts-martial under the UCMJ,
among other things. Naval Justice School Annual Course Catalog Fiscal Year 2020, U.S.
NAVY 32, https://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/Navy%202020%20Course%20Catalog.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019). Legal officers in the Navy and Marine Corps receive approximately
two weeks of formal military education and may perform their duties as a legal officer concurrently with their more traditional military duties, like being a pilot or logistician. See id.
(inferring that legal officer training is available for military officers who have considerable
experience in non-legal specialties and responsibilities that extend beyond legal affairs).
11 DUI is punishable under Article 113, UCMJ. 10 U.S.C.A. § 913 (West 2019).
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(OPNAVINST) 3120.32D.12 The Sergeant Major assures me that after Jones
made his initial statement, but before Jones told the Sergeant Major the details
of his arrest, he read Jones his Article 31(b) rights.13
After hearing the news of Jones’s DUI, the Commanding Officer—the squadron’s highest-ranking officer and my boss—instructs me to draft charges against
Jones for violating Article 113 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
relying solely upon Jones’s conversation with the Sergeant Major as evidence.
Shortly after, Jones appears in a non-judicial punishment proceeding, where he
is found guilty.14 As punishment, the Commanding Officer reduces Jones’s rank,
deprives him of one-half his monthly salary for two months, and physically restricts Jones for thirty days.15 Several pertinent questions present themselves: But
for Jones reporting his DUI charge, would he have been punished under Article
113? Further, would Jones have been punished at all but for OPNAVINST
3120.32D, which required Jones to report his DUI arrest? What about Jones’s
right against self-incrimination?
B. Outline of Argument
By compelling servicemembers to self-report their civilian arrests and criminal charges, the United States military violates international law and norms that
protect against compulsory self-incrimination, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Note will first discuss why the
United States may be violating international standards regarding compulsory
12 See DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, OPNAVINST
3120.32D ¶ 5.1.6 (July 16, 2012), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/03000%20
Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-100%20Naval%20Operations%20Support/3
120.32D%20W%20CH-1.pdf, as amended by NAVADMIN 373/11 (8 Dec. 2011) [hereinafter
OPNAVINST 3120.32D] (“Any person arrested or criminally charged by civil authorities will
immediately advise their immediate commander of the fact that they were arrested or
charged.”).
13 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2018) (“No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any
statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement
made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.”).
14 See id. § 815 (authorizing military commanders to impose administrative punishment
for minor offenses in lieu of trial by court-martial).
15 See id. § 815(b)(2)(H) (defining sentencing limitations of non-judicial punishment).
Restriction is a common punishment that is highly tailorable by a servicemember’s commander and takes the form of an order from the commander to the servicemember. See id. §
815(b)(2)(H)(vi) (inferring that commanders may specify the limits and terms of restriction).
For example, a restricted servicemember could be ordered to remain in uniform and on base
at all times throughout the restriction period.
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self-incrimination, including its own constitutional protections. Part II will discuss the origin of the self-reporting regulation, its evolution in response to
caselaw, and its present state. Part III will then introduce applicable international
law and standards and explain why domestic military law is applied to United
States servicemembers in foreign states. Subsequently, Part IV will analyze the
current state of the self-reporting regulation and whether or not it abides by international standards relating to compulsory self-incrimination. Part IV will also
examine whether violations of international standards have any meaningful impact upon the United States military’s commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and other international organizations. Finally, Part V will
conclude that self-reporting regulations, as they presently stand, threaten servicemembers’ right against self-incrimination under domestic and international law,
and such violations may obliquely conflict with the status of forces agreement
between the United States and NATO.
II. BACKGROUND
The current form of the substantive law that creates and defines servicemembers’ duty to self-report follows from (1) the promulgation of Navy regulations,
(2) judicial response to those regulations, and (3) subsequent amendments of initial regulations in response to court rulings.16 As this area of the law has evolved,
servicemember self-incrimination protections embedded within the law have become considerably more robust, yet they do not afford servicemembers absolute
immunity from prosecution.17
A. OPNAVINST 3120.32D
OPNAVINST 3120.32D is a comprehensive military order, promulgated by
the Chief of Naval Operations, and internally titled “Standard Organization and
Regulations of the U.S. Navy.”18 In a single paragraph, this order prescribes servicemembers’ duty to self-report and self-incrimination protections surrounding
that duty, consolidating nearly a decade of substantive law surrounding compulsory self-reporting.19

16 See discussion infra Section II.B. (describing the evolution of the substantive law surrounding the self-reporting requirement).
17 Id. (citing in support the case of United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 162 (C.A.A.F.
2015)).
18 See generally OPNAVINST 3120.32D supra note 12 (illustrating the diverse topics
covered by this regulation, ranging from sentry duty to sleeping arrangements, among other
things).
19 See Castillo, 74 M.J. at 162; see also discussion infra Section II.B. (describing the evolution of the substantive law surrounding the self-reporting requirement).
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i. Duties and Justification
Paragraph 5.1.6 of the OPNAVINST 3120.32D, among other things, requires
“[a]ny person arrested or criminally charged by civil authorities shall immediately advise their immediate commander of the fact that they were arrested or
charged. The term arrest includes an arrest or detention, and the term charged
includes the filing of criminal charges.”20 In the military, failure to follow a lawful order or regulation, including OPNAVINST 3120.32D, is punishable by law
under Article 92, UCMJ.21 Returning to our hypothetical, had Jones failed to
report his DUI arrest, he could be tried at a court-martial for violating Article 92,
UCMJ for failing to comply with OPNAVINST 3120.32D, a presumably lawful
regulation.22
ii. Protections and Limitations
OPNAVINST 3120.32D does, however, provide some protections in that it
limits the information self-reporting servicemembers are required to disclose to
include only “the date of arrest or criminal charges, the arresting or charging
authority, and the offense for which [the servicemember was] arrested or
charged.”23 Additionally, OPNAVINST 3120.32D states:
[n]o person is under a duty to disclose any of the underlying facts
concerning the basis for their arrest or criminal charges . . . . Disclosure of arrest or criminal charges is not an admission of guilt
and may not be used as such, nor is it intended to elicit an admission from the person self-reporting. No person subject to the
UCMJ may question a person self-reporting an arrest or criminal
charges regarding any aspect of the self-report, unless they first
advise the person of their rights under UCMJ Article 31(b).24
On its face, OPNAVINST 3120.32D appears to protect servicemembers from
self-incrimination by characterizing disclosure of arrest or criminal charges as
“not an admission of guilt” that is not “intended to elicit an admission.”25 Moreover, the regulation appears to limit the substantive information obtained by
commanders during a self-report, in turn, limiting the evidentiary value of the

20
21
22
23
24
25

OPNAVINST 3120.32D supra note 12, at ¶ 5.16.
10 U.S.C. § 892(1) (2018).
Id.
OPNAVINST 3120.32D supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
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content of a self-report if it were permissible to use for punitive purposes.26
Lastly, as a general limitation and possible implicit justification for flirting with
compulsory self-incrimination, OPNAVINST 3120.32D’s stated purpose is “to
monitor and maintain the personnel readiness, welfare, safety, and deployability
of the force.”27
B. Evolution of the Law Regarding Self-Report Regulations
The constitutionality of the self-reporting regulations at issue in this note were
first addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) in
United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010).28 Though the Navy modified its self-reporting regulation in response to Serianne, the regulation was again
challenged in Castillo.29
i. United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010)
In Serianne, C.A.A.F.30 addressed whether the appellee, a sailor who failed to
report an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol as required by a precursor of OPNAVINST 3120.32D, OPNAVINST 5350.4C, could be punished
under Article 92, UCMJ for failure to self-report.31 At the time of appellee’s
charged DUI offense, paragraph 8.n. of OPNAVINST 5350.4C stated:
[m]embers arrested for an alcohol-related offense under civil authority, which if punished under the UCMJ would result in a punishment of confinement for 1 year or more, or a punitive discharge or dismissal from the Service (e.g., DUI/DWI), shall
promptly notify their [Commanding Officer]. Failure to do so
may constitute an offense punishable under Article 92, UCMJ.32
While the court did not address the constitutionality of OPNAVINST
5350.4C, the court did address what it ultimately determined to be a conflict
26 See id. (limiting the substantive content required to be disclosed in self-reports to “the
date of arrest or criminal charges, the arresting or charging authority, and the offense for which
[the servicemember was] arrested/charged”).
27 Id.
28 United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
29 See discussion infra Sections II.B.2–3.
30 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) “is the military’s highest judicial authority before the Supreme Court.” Randall Leonard & Joseph Toth, Failure to Report:
The Right Against Self-Incrimination and the Navy’s Treatment of Civilian Arrests After
United States v. Serianne, 213 MIL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012).
31 Serianne, 69 M.J. at 10. In Serianne, “OPNAVINST 5350.4C, Drug and Alcohol
Abuse Prevention and Control (Dec. 8, 2005), [w]as the source of the self-reporting duty at
issue.” Id. at 8.
32 Id. at 8–9.
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between OPNAVINST 5350.4C and Navy regulations of superior regulatory authority which provided protections against self-incrimination.33 However, the
C.A.A.F. did not vacate or reverse the Navy-Marine Court of Criminal Appeals
(NMCCA)34 decision; rather, it chose to avoid addressing the constitutionality of
OPNAVINST 5350.4C altogether.35
ii. Amended Self-Report Regulations
In response to Serianne, the Navy amended its regulations.36 In July 2010, the
Secretary of the Navy released an All Navy (ALNAV) administrative message
(ALNAV 049/10) “disseminated throughout the Navy with the subject line
‘Change to U.S. Navy Regulations in light of [United States. v. Serianne].’”37
ALNAV 049/10 added new language to the Navy regulations to resolve conflict
addressed by C.A.A.F. in Serianne: the “Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval
Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps may promulgate regulations
or instructions that require servicemembers to report civilian arrests or filing of
criminal charges if those regulations or instructions serve a regulatory or administrative purpose.”38
In December 2011, the Chief of Naval Operations released an additional administrative message (NAVADMIN 373/11), amending OPNAVINST
3120.32C to include the following:
Any person arrested or criminally charged by civil authorities
shall immediately advise their immediate commander of the fact
that they were arrested or charged. The term arrest includes an
arrest or detention, and the term charged includes the filing of
criminal charges. Persons are only required to disclose the date
of arrest/criminal charges, the arresting/charging authority, and
the offense for which they were arrested/charged. No person is
under a duty to disclose any of the underlying facts concerning
the basis for their arrest or criminal charges. Disclosure is
33 Id. at 10 (“In determining whether to decide the present case on constitutional or nonconstitutional grounds, we may take into account the nonconstitutional regulatory matter discussed by the court below—the relationship between the self-reporting requirement in
[OPNAVINST 5350.4C] and the exclusion from self-reporting provided in Article 1137 of the
United States Navy Regulations.”).
34 NMCCA is the military appellate court immediately inferior to C.A.A.F. in authority.
In Serianne, C.A.A.F. is reviewing NMCCA’s decision. Id.
35 Id.; Leonard & Toth, supra note 30, at 19 (“The CAAF did not address the NMCCA’s
constitutional holding. Instead, it chose to avoid the constitutional question, citing the
longstanding Avoidance Doctrine . . . .”).
36 United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 162 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
37 Id.
38 Id.
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required to monitor and maintain the personnel readiness, welfare, safety, and deployability of the force. Disclosure of arrest/criminal charges is not an admission of guilt and may not be
used as such, nor is it intended to elicit an admission from the
person self-reporting. No person subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) may question a person self-reporting an
arrest/criminal charges regarding any aspect of the self-report,
unless they first advise the person of their rights under UCMJ Article 31(b).39
In addition to amending OPNAVINST 3120.32C, NAVADMIN 373/11 provided substantive and procedural guidance to military commanders relating to
self-reports and disciplinary action.40 This guidance addressed two categories of
disciplinary action: (1) disciplinary action for failure to self-report an arrest or
criminal charge and (2) disciplinary action for offenses underlying the self-report.41 Of particular note, NAVADMIN 373/11 imposed additional protections
for self-reporting servicemembers, directing the following:
Commanders may impose disciplinary action for failure to selfreport an arrest or criminal charges. However, when a service
member does self-report pursuant to a valid self-reporting requirement, commanders will not impose disciplinary action for
the underlying offense unless such disciplinary action is based
solely on evidence derived independently of the self-report. Commanders should consult a judge advocate prior to imposing disciplinary action.42

39 U.S. NAVY, NAVADMIN 373/11, CHANGE TO U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS IN LIGHT OF
U.S. V. SERIANNE ¶ 4(C) (2011), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/
Documents2/NAV2011/NAV11373.txt.
40 Id. ¶ 6.
41 Id.
42 Id. ¶ 6(B) (emphasis added). NAVADMIN 373/11’s recommendation that commanders consult a judge advocate, a military lawyer, is noteworthy in that it highlights the elevated
complexity of imposing disciplinary action upon self-reporting servicemembers. Cf. 10 U.S.C.
§ 815 (2019) (empowering military commanders to impose nonjudicial punishment without
convening a court-martial or consulting a judge advocate); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL pt. 5, ¶ 2 (2019) (stating no express requirement that a commander consult a judge advocate prior to initiating nonjudicial punishment proceedings);
USN/USMC Commander’s Quick Reference Legal Handbook 1, 37 (June 2020),
https://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NJS/Quickman.pdf (inferring that absent a regulation
like NAVADMIN 373/11, a commander has no default requirement to consult a judge advocate prior to imposing nonjudicial punishment) (“A [commander] has broad discretion over
which offenses should be handled under the provisions of [10 U.S.C. § 815] . . . . A unit’s
Staff Judge Advocate can assist in this determination.”).
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These additional self-report protections were not incorporated with the other
amendments to OPNAVINST 3120.32C.43
iii. United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160 (C.A.A.F. 2015)
In United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160 (C.A.A.F. 2015), the court was again
faced with a case involving a sailor who failed to report her arrest for drunk driving and was therefore accused of violating Article 92 of the UCMJ.44 In Castillo,
unlike Serianne, the post-Serianne amendments to Navy regulations and administrative guidance were in effect.45 In that case, the court addressed “[w]hether
the lower court improperly determined that [the] duty to self-report one’s own
criminal arrests found in office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
3120.32C was valid despite the instruction’s obvious conflict with superior authority and the Fifth Amendment.”46 After determining that the self-report regulation did not conflict with superior regulatory authority, the court turned to the
question involving the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.47
The court asked two questions: (1) “whether the self-reporting regulation can be
applied in a manner that upholds the Constitution,” and (2) “whether it was so
applied to Appellant.”48 The court declined to resolve “hypothetical situations
designed to test the limits” of the regulation, limiting its inquiry to the application
of OPNAVINST 3120.32C to the appellant.49 After considering the regulation’s
safeguards against further questioning or prosecution, the court determined that
the regulation did not “present[] a ‘real and appreciable’ hazard of self-incrimination, where the regulation is in fact followed as drafted.”50 Ultimately, the
court held that OPNAVINST 3120.32C was “facially constitutional and authorized by U.S. Naval Regs., Article 1137.”51 In short, the court certified that the
amendments to the regulation, resulting from Serianne, effectively cured the regulation’s deficiencies.

U.S. NAVY, supra note 39 ¶ 1.
United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 161 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
45 Id. at 162–63.
46 Id. at 161.
47 Id. at 165.
48 Id. at 165–66.
49 Id. at 166. (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22 (2010)).
50 Castillo, 74 M.J. at 166 (emphasis added) (“[A]lthough a reasonable argument exists
that the compelled disclosure of an arrest by civilian authorities is testimonial and incriminating, the reporting requirement prohibits commanders from imposing disciplinary action on the
basis of the underlying arrested offense, ‘unless such disciplinary action is based solely on
evidence derived independently of the self-report.’”).
51 Id. at 168.
43
44
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C. Amplifying Regulations and Administrative Guidance
In addition to their initial issuance in NAVADMIN 373/11, the self-reporting
protections to which the Castillo court referred were codified in the Navy’s Judge
Advocate General Instruction 5800.7F CH-2: Manual of the Judge Advocate
General (JAGMAN).52 Elaborating upon the substantive protections included in
NAVADMIN 373/11, § 0108(c) of the JAGMAN further defines, among other
things, what constitutes “evidence derived independently of the required selfreport.”53 JAGMAN § 0108(c)(3) states:
[i]ndependent evidence may not be derived from information received from the Service member through a required self-report.
If the only reason the command knows about the arrest, charging,
or conviction is the self-report, then the command does not have
independent evidence unless the [s]ervice member makes an incriminating statement after receiving notification of and waiving
his or her Article 31 rights.54
Section 0108 goes on to provide examples of independent evidence, but makes
no further mention of incriminating statements made after Article 31 rights notification as independent evidence.55 The italicized portion of JAGMAN §
0108(c)(3) above poses a critical question: if a servicemember is only being
questioned as the result of her self-report, even if the servicemember waives her
Article 31 rights and makes incriminating statements, would those statements
constitute independent evidence? Though the JAGMAN is an inferior regulatory
authority in comparison to OPNAVINST 3120.32D,56 its relatively detailed explanations and concrete examples of the self-report process render it a valuable
tool for military commanders and their legal teams in light of OPNAVINST
3120.32D ¶ 5.1.6’s broad language.

52 U.S. NAVY, JAGINST 5800.7F CH-3, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
§ 0108(C) (2020), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/SECNAV%20Manuals1/5800.7F%20C
H-3.pdf [hereinafter JAGMAN]. The purpose of the JAGMAN is to “prescribe regulations
implementing or supplementing certain provisions of the UCMJ or the [Manual for CourtsMartial].” Id. § 0101(a).
53 Id. § 0108(c)(2).
54 Id. § 0108(c)(3) (emphasis added).
55 Id. (“Examples of independent evidence include: (a) News reports or social media; (b)
Third-party reporting; (c) Unsolicited information conveyed by the arresting or charging authority; or (d) Bona fide command programs to screen for criminal information involving Service members (e.g., weekly screen of arrest records for names of command members).”).
56 The JAGMAN is promulgated by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy who is subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations, the promulgator of OPNAVINST 3120.32D.
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D. Applying the Self-Report Regulation: Decisions for Commanders and
Service Members
In handling self-reports, military commanders and their legal teams57 must
consider the amalgam of legal authority58 that has evolved since Serianne.
Though OPNAVINST 3120.32D and the JAGMAN are intended to provide
commanders with sufficient guidance for processing self-reports, it seems difficult to capture the nuanced judicial opinions within relatively short regulations.
Though it may seem readily obvious that a commander should consult a judge
advocate when facing complex legal issues, neither the text of OPNAVINST
3120.32D nor the JAGMAN requires commanders to consult a judge advocate
when handling self-reporting cases.59 Of the three authoritative documents in this
paragraph, only NAVADMIN 373/11, a message nearly a decade old, requires
commanders to consult a judge advocate prior to imposing disciplinary action in
self-reporting cases.60 Thus, it seems unlikely that a commander who is contemplating disciplinary proceedings in a self-reporting case will know she is required
to consult with a judge advocate unless she or her staff is aware of NAVADMIN
373/11.
III. LAW
Unlike much of U.S. domestic law, domestic military law remains applicable
in foreign states where the United States has a military presence,61 often through
a status of forces agreement (SOFA).62 For instance, U.S. servicemembers

57 The sophistication of a commander’s legal team varies based upon the commander’s
military rank and station. Practically speaking, this means that commanders, who are generally
not judge advocates, may not have constant or immediate access to a military lawyer. See
generally U.S. MARINE CORPS, MCRP 5-12D: ORGANIZATION OF MARINE CORPS FORCES 6-2
(1998), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCRP%205-12D%20Organization
%20of%20Marine%20Corps%20Forces.pdf (highlighting the relative scarcity of military attorneys, known as “judge advocates,” within the organizational structure of the Marine Corps).
58 This amalgam consists of OPNAVINST3120.32D, its modifying administrative messages like ALNAV 049/10 and NAVADMIN 373/11, supplemental regulations like the
JAGMAN, and caselaw.
59 OPNAVINST 3120.32D, supra note 12; JAGMAN, supra note 52.
60 NAVADMIN 373/11, supra note 39.
61 E.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization Agreement between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, art. 7, Jun. 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199
U.N.T.S 67 (“The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to
offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State,
but not by the law of the receiving State.”) [hereinafter NATO SOFA].
62 R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL7-5700, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
(SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 1 (2012) (“SOFAs provide for rights
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serving in NATO countries may exclusively be under the jurisdiction of U.S.
military law.63 Further, in some cases where the host country and the United
States exercise concurrent jurisdiction over an offense, the “military authorities
of the [United States] shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a
member of a force . . . .”64 Therefore, in situations where a foreign country’s laws
would normally apply to civilian U.S. nationals, in the case of U.S. servicemembers, U.S. military law still applies—often exclusively. Section A will discuss
two international agreements that bar compulsory self-incrimination to illustrate
how OPNAVINST 3120.32D is problematic—beyond the applicability of U.S.
law on foreign soil.
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
On December 19, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly opened the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for signature.65 The
United States signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1977 and ratified it on June 8,
1992.66 Article 14 of the ICCPR is primarily concerned with rights and protections for persons accused of crimes and provides protections for the accused in a
similar fashion to the Bill of Rights contained within the U.S. Constitution.67
Article 14, paragraph 3(g) of the ICCPR guarantees that a person accused of a
crime shall “[n]ot . . . be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt.”68 Thus, given the similarities in the text and structure of the ICCPR and
U.S. Constitution, a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
would likely constitute a violation of Article 14 of the ICCPR, provided that the
purported violator has ratified the treaty.
B. The American Convention on Human Rights
On November 22, 1969, the ACHR was adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica.69 The United
and privileges of covered individuals while in a foreign jurisdiction and address how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel.”).
63 Id.
64 NATO SOFA supra note 61, at art. 7.
65 ICCPR, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
66 Id.
67 ICCPR, supra note 1, at Part III, art. 14 (guaranteeing that defendants are entitled to
“communicate with counsel of his own choosing,” to “be tried without undue delay,” and to
“examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him,” among other guarantees); cf. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. (guaranteeing that defendants “have the assistance of counsel,” “shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,” and “be confronted with the witnesses against him”).
68 ICCPR, supra note 1, at Part III, art. 14; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (guaranteeing that
no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”).
69 American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter AHCR].
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States signed, but did not ratify, the ACHR on June 1, 1977.70 Among other
things, Article 8(2)(g) of the ACHR guarantees every person, “the right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.”71 The ACHR, similar to the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, provides protections for those accused of a crime, including the right “to be assisted by legal counsel” and to
“examine witnesses.”72 Given the textual and structural similarities, a violation
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would likely constitute a violation of Article 8(2)(g) of the ACHR.
IV. APPLICATION
By examining realistic hypothetical situations similar to the hypothetical presented in the Introduction, this analysis will determine whether the OPNAVINST
3120.32D—in its current state—conflicts with the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and thus conflicts with international self-incrimination standards.
Specifically, this analysis will address two broad questions. First, this analysis
will consider whether the current law is theoretically sound but sufficiently difficult to apply in practice, subjecting servicemembers who self-report—pursuant
to the self-reporting regulation requirement—to an unacceptable risk of prosecution. Second, this analysis will assess whether the law in its current state, when
applied correctly, creates unacceptable risk of prosecution to self-reporting servicemembers.
A. Difficulties in Application of Self-Report Regulations
While OPNAVINST 3120.32D’s protections may be sufficient “where the
regulation is in fact followed as drafted,”73 whether the regulation is actually
followed as written is a separate question.74 In the event that OPNAVINST
3120.32D is incorrectly followed, exposing servicemembers to an unacceptable
risk of self-incrimination, it is important to consider why it was followed incorrectly. If the regulation is followed incorrectly, out of bad faith or other reasons
unrelated to the text of the regulation, then changes to the regulation would likely
70 United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid
=08000002800f10e1&clang=_en (last visited Sept. 16, 2020); see also ECHR, supra note 1
(recognizing a right not to incriminate oneself under the ECHR, another treaty that the United
States has not ratified).
71 AHCR, supra note 69, art. 8(2)(g).
72 Id.; cf. U.S. CONST. amends. V–VI. (guaranteeing that defendants “shall [not] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” “have the assistance of counsel,”
“shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,” and “be confronted with the witnesses
against him”).
73 United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
74 See id. (inferring that misapplication of the regulation could present a “real and appreciable” hazard of self-incrimination (quoting Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968))).
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have little to no effect in remedying the misapplication. Alternatively, if a servicemember of average sophistication in a leadership position, such as the legal
officer in the introductory hypothetical, cannot apply the regulation as written
without subjecting the self-reporting servicemember to unacceptable risk of selfincrimination, the regulation may be in conflict with self-incrimination standards
similar to those adopted by the ICCPR, ECHR, and ACHR.
i. Misapplication by Commanders
Between the commander and servicemember, the commander is generally the
more sophisticated of the two in terms of regulatory knowledge and access to
military legal specialists.75 Assuming that judge advocates and legal officers are
aware of OPNAVINST 3120.32D, a commander will likely take appropriate action if he consults these advisors, given the advisors’ formal education in military
law. This likelihood increases, a fortiori, if the legal advisors in question are
actual attorneys. Conversely, where a commander is faced with a self-reporting
case and has no access to a legal advisor, either due to scarcity or timing,76 the
likelihood of such case being properly handled diminishes. Therefore, the propriety of a commander’s handling of a self-reporting case relies largely upon the
timing of the report and the commander’s access to legal advice.
ii. Misapplication by the Self-Reporting Servicemember
Like the commander, the greater the servicemember’s knowledge of the selfreporting regulation and his rights under the UCMJ, the more likely his self-incrimination rights will remain intact. However, the self-reporting process under
the regulation may be confusing for a layperson, and perhaps even an attorney
may find it difficult to ascertain where the regulation’s self-incrimination protections begin and end. A layperson may not foresee that the initial, mandatory selfreport is protected under the regulation, but that his immediate follow-up statement after being read his Article 31(b) rights is not protected—or is it? If the
JAGMAN requires that the evidence used for disciplinary action be independent,77 and that evidence is a voluntary statement that would not have occurred
but for the self-report, does that constitute independent evidence regardless of
the Article 31(b) warning? The answer to this question does not expressly appear
in the JAGMAN nor in OPNAVINST 3120.32D. Given the complexity of the
75 See U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 57 (inferring that between a commander and a noncommander servicemember, a commander has more access to military legal experts).
76 For instance, if a servicemember self-reports to an immediate supervisor after hours,
the commander may not have an opportunity to seek legal advice before that supervisor reads
the servicemember his Article 31(b) rights and takes a voluntary and self-incriminating statement.
77 JAGMAN, supra note 52.
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procedures involved in a self-report, a servicemember could easily waive his
right to remain silent inadvertently. It seems counterintuitive that a servicemember must self-report at the outset, but after the talismanic Article 31(b) warning
is given, the servicemember must not self-report if she wants to preserve her selfincrimination protections. Such procedures hardly guarantee any rights against
self-incrimination.
B. International Ramifications
The international ramifications of OPNAVINST 3120.32D are unclear. On
one hand, the NATO SOFA—the SOFA with the United States’ arguably most
visible alliance—is noticeably silent about self-incrimination, despite enumerating other familiar-sounding rights of the accused.78 On the other hand, Germany,
a NATO member, employs “procedures against self-incrimination [that] are
equal to, or perhaps even stronger than, American standards.”79
Moreover, all thirty NATO members80 have agreed to be bound by the ICCPR,
which prohibits compulsory self-incrimination.81 Thus, if the NATO SOFA
binds NATO members to either the member’s law or its NATO host-nation’s
law, and all NATO members have agreed to be bound by the ICCPR, it follows
that a violation of the ICCPR constitutes a violation of the NATO SOFA? The
inference that a violation of a servicemember’s self-incrimination rights constitutes a violation of the NATO SOFA may appear to be a stretch. However, the
fact that each NATO member condemns compulsory self-incrimination via the
ICCPR is in itself significant and may effectively negate the proposition that the
NATO SOFA is silent about self-incrimination. Additionally, having ratified the
ICCPR, the United States is bound by the ICCPR independent of any SOFA,
including the NATO SOFA.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. military, in its promulgation of the U.S. Navy’s OPNAVINST
3120.32D, risks conflict with international law and standards concerning
78 NATO SOFA, supra note 61 at § 9 (guaranteeing visiting servicemembers in a NATO
member the right to “a prompt and speedy trial,” “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him,” and “to have legal representation,” among other things, but omitting protections against
compulsory self-incrimination).
79 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE, HEADQUARTERS USAREUR AND 7TH ARMY,
COUNTRY LAW STUDY: GERMANY 45 (2007), https://www.aepubs.eur.army.mil/Portals/18/
docs/CLS-Germany.pdf; see generally STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STOP] [CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE], as amended by Article 3 of the Act of 23 April 2014, §§ 114–15, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.).
80 NATO Member Countries, NATO, (May 31, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm.
81 ICCPR, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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compulsory self-incrimination. As military self-reporting regulations have
evolved in response to caselaw, later iterations of self-reporting regulations—
including OPNAVINST 3120.32D—have implemented protections that significantly reduce or eliminate the risk of compulsory self-incrimination when followed as drafted. The complexity of OPNAVINST 3120.32D, however, and the
danger of its misapplication raise serious concerns about its compliance with domestic and international law, including the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the ICCPR, and the NATO SOFA. While the practical ramifications of
OPNAVINST 3120.32D are impinging upon international law, including the
NATO SOFA, they are unlikely to eclipse the importance of protecting servicemembers’ Fifth Amendment rights. The near-universality of protections against
self-incrimination underscore the importance of self-incrimination protections
and urge further review of self-reporting regulations such as OPNAVINST
3120.32D.

